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Recent theories of drug dependence propose that the transition from occasional recreational substance use to harmful
use and dependence results from the impact of disrupted midbrain dopamine signals for reinforcement learning on
frontal brain areas that implement cognitive control and decision-making. We investigated this hypothesis in humans
using electrophysiological and behavioral measures believed to assay the integrity of midbrain dopamine system and
its neural targets. Our investigation revealed two groups of dependent individuals, one characterized by disrupted
dopamine-dependent reward learning and the other by disrupted error learning associated with depression-proneness.
These results highlight important neurobiological and behavioral differences between two classes of dependent users
that can inform the development of individually tailored treatment programs.
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INTRODUCTION
Are we in control of our own decisions? Most of us feel in
control, but individuals who suffer from severe drug
dependence exhibit impaired control over their substance
use despite often catastrophic consequences on personal
health, finances and social relationships. Yet, despite the
widespread availability and prevalence of addictive sub-
stances in most societies (Anderson 2006), only some
drug users ultimately become dependent (Kessler et al.
2005). Over the last several decades, multidisciplinary
efforts in addictions research have indicated that sub-
stance dependence results from a confluence of risk
factors related to biology, cognition and learning, person-
ality, genetics and the social environment, but there is as
yet little direct evidence in humans of the neuroadaptive
mechanisms that mediate the transition from occasional,
controlled drug use to the impaired control that charac-
terizes severe dependence (Hyman 2007).
Notably, all addictive drugs stimulate the midbrain
dopamine system (MDS) (Di Chiara & Imperato 1988),
which projects to and regulates brain structures underly-
ing cognitive control and decision-making, namely pre-
frontal cortex (Cohen, Braver & Brown 2002), anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Holroyd & Coles 2002) and the
basal ganglia (BG) (Cohen & Frank 2008). MDS neurons
distribute information about rewarding events such that
phasic bursts and dips in dopamine neuron activity are
elicited when events are, respectively, ‘better than
expected’ [positive reward prediction error (RPE)] and
‘worse than expected’ (negative RPE) (Schultz 1998). In
keeping with formal models of reinforcement learning,
these RPEs ‘propagate back in time’ in trial-and-error
learning tasks from reward delivery to the earliest predic-
tive indicator of reward. Accordingly, it has been sug-
gested that the dopamine RPEs serve as reinforcement
learning signals, gradually optimizing behavior by asso-
ciating predictive cues and behaviors with forthcoming
rewards (Schultz 1998). In this way, the dopamine RPE
signals appear to increase the ‘incentive salience’ or
‘wanting’ of rewards, that is, the motivation to work for
the reward in a given behavioral context, as distinct from
the affective enjoyment or ‘liking’ of the reward when
consumed (McClure, Daw & Montague 2003).
In view of the role played by theMDS in reinforcement
learning, addiction has recently been hypothesized to be
fundamentally a problem of learning and memory
(Hyman 2005). According to this view, drugs of abuse
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effectively increase the magnitude of the positive RPEs
carried by the MDS by raising extracellular dopamine
levels either directly or indirectly (Di Chiara & Imperato
1988). Whereas natural rewards and external cues
associated with reward produce transient increases in
dopamine neuron activity only when these events are
unexpected, addictive drugs and drug-related cues
increase dopamine levels even when these events are
expected, thereby augmenting the size of the elicited posi-
tive RPE signals (Rice & Cragg 2004). In turn, these exag-
gerated signals induce changes to synaptic connectivity
(Hyman, Malenka & Nestler 2006) that rewire and
disrupt the neural targets of the MDS in ACC, BG and
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Robinson & Kolb 2004;
Homayoun & Moghaddam 2006), causing the motiva-
tional value of states that precede drug consumption to
grow without bound (Redish 2004). Because these brain
areas implement neural processes that are central to
cognitive control and decision-making—including
goal-directed action selection, response activation and
inhibition, performance monitoring and reward-based
learning (Miller & Cohen 2001; Cohen et al. 2002;
Holroyd & Coles 2002; Cohen & Frank 2008)—addictive
drugs are sometimes said to ‘usurp’ the cognitive control
system (Hyman 2007).
Here, we hypothesized that the impact of disrupted
RPEs on brain networks involved in cognitive control and
decision-making precipitate the compulsive drug use that
defines severe dependence. To investigate this hypothesis,
we indirectly assayed the integrity of the dopamine
system and frontal brain areas involved in cognitive
control and decision-making in young adults using a
combination of electrophysiological and behavioral
measures together with surveys of substance use and
personality.
Specifically, to assess the neural integrity of the MDS
and its projections to frontal cortex, event-related brain
potentials (ERPs) were recorded from participants as they
navigated a ‘virtual T-maze’ to find rewards (Baker &
Holroyd 2009). It is believed that the impact of dopamine
RPEs on motor-related areas in ACC modulate the ampli-
tude of a component of the ERP called the feedback error-
related negativity (fERN) (Holroyd & Coles 2002; Baker &
Holroyd 2009). Like the dopamine RPE signals, the fERN
is sensitive to events that first indicate when events are
better or worse than expected (Holroyd & Coles 2002;
Holroyd & Krigolson 2007; Baker & Holroyd 2009;
Holroyd et al. 2009). Further, genetic (Marco-Pallares
et al. 2009), pharmacological and neuropsychological
(Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis & Ridderinkhof 2005) evidence
implicates dopamine in fERN production, although the
specific mechanism is debated (Jocham & Ullsperger
2009).We predicted that if substance dependence results
in part from the impact of disrupted dopamine RPE
signals on frontal brain structures involved in cognitive
control, then the fERN should be abnormal in Dependent
but not Non-dependent individuals.
In addition, immediately following the T-maze partici-
pants engaged in the Probabilistic Selection Task (PST)
(Frank, Seeberger & O’reilly 2004), a trial-and-error
learning task that is believed to be sensitive to dopamine
dysfunction. The PST has provided insight into individual
differences related to Parkinson’s disease, attention-
deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, normal
aging, genetic makeup, the effect of dopaminergic ago-
nists and antagonists, and ‘top-down’ modulation of the
BG by OFC and ACC (Cohen & Frank 2008). According
to an influential neurocomputational theory of the
BG-MDS, positive dopamine RPEs facilitate approach
learning in this task by reinforcing a BG ‘Go’ pathway via
D1 receptors, whereas negative dopamine RPEs facilitate
avoidance learning by reinforcing a BG ‘No-go’ pathway
via D2 receptors (Cohen & Frank 2008). For example,
prior studies revealed that people with Parkinson’s
disease, who have low striatal dopamine levels, were
better at avoidance learning than approach learning;
dopamine medications reversed this bias as predicted by
the models (Frank et al. 2004). We predicted that if sub-
stance dependence results in part from the impact of dis-
rupted dopamine RPE signals on brain structures
involved in decision-making, then performance in this
task should be abnormal in Dependent but not Non-
dependent individuals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We first collected survey data (substance use history, per-
sonality risk factors associated with addiction and family
history) from 412 first- and second-year undergraduate
students. Of these participants, 70 agreed to return to
participate in an electrophysiological and behavioral
experiment on a subsequent day (two additional partici-
pants were excluded because of a reported head injury).
The computer-based survey was comprised of several
separate inventories, namely, the Alcohol, Smoking and
Substance Involvement Screening Test (ASSIST) (Hume-
niuk & Ali 2006), a validated screening test developed by
the World Health Organization for identifying the degree
of problematic substance use (i.e. tobacco, alcohol, can-
nabis, cocaine, amphetamine-type stimulants, sedatives,
hallucinogens, inhalants, opioids and ‘other drugs’); the
Severity of Alcohol Dependence Questionnaire, which
assesses the severity of alcohol abuse and dependence
(Stockwell, Murphy & Hodgson 1983); the Addiction-
Prone Personality (APP) Scale (Anderson et al. 1999), a
21-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the role of
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personality in the susceptibility to addiction; and the Sub-
stance Use Risk Profile Scale (SURPS) (Conrod & Woicik
2002), a 23-item self report questionnaire that provides
a measure on four dimensions of personality traits—
depression-proneness, anxiety-sensitivity, impulsivity
and sensation seeking—that are risk factors for sub-
stance use.
For the purpose of this study, participants were classi-
fied as either Dependent or Non-dependent substance
users according to their scores on the Global Continuum
of Substance Risk (GCR) scale of the ASSIST. Specifically,
participants with GCR scores falling within the bottom
(score < 16) and top (score > 41) quartiles of our sample
were classified as Non-dependent (18 participants) and
Dependent (18 participants) users, respectively. These
scores are comparable with the cut-offs established in
previous validation studies of the ASSIST for non-
dependence (score < 15) and dependence (score > 39.5)
(Newcombe, Humeniuk & Ali 2005). The Dependent
Group tended to abuse alcohol, cannabis and tobacco, but
some individuals also reported taking amphetamines,
cocaine, sedatives and/or hallucinogens (see supporting
information; details are provided at the end of the paper).
The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards prescribed in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
ERP task—virtual T-maze
The virtual T-maze is a guessing/reinforcement learning
task that elicits robust fERNs (Baker & Holroyd 2009).
Participants navigated the virtual T-maze by pressing left
and right buttons corresponding to images of a left and
right alley presented on a computer screen. After each
response, an image of the chosen alley appeared, followed
by a feedback stimulus (apple or orange) indicating
whether the participant received 0 or 5 cents on that trial;
unbeknown to the participants, the feedbackwas random
and equiprobable. The experiment consisted of four
blocks of 50 trials each separated by rest periods. ERPs
were created for each electrode and subject by averaging
the single-trial electroencephalography (EEG) according
to feedback type (for a complete description of EEG Data
Acquisition and Analysis methods, please see SOM).
For each participant, the fERN was measured at
channel FCz, where it reaches maximum amplitude
(Miltner, Braun & Coles 1997; Holroyd & Krigolson
2007). To isolate the fERN from other overlapping ERP
components, the fERNwas evaluated for each participant
as a difference wave by subtracting the Reward feedback
ERPs from the corresponding No-reward feedback ERPs
(Miltner et al. 1997; Holroyd & Krigolson 2007). The
mean amplitude of this difference wave was obtained by
averaging the difference wave within a 200–320 ms
window following feedback onset. The P2 and P3 compo-
nents were also measured for the purpose of comparison.
The P2 was measured base-to-peak at a frontal-central
channel (FCz) for the Reward and No-reward ERPs. The
P3 amplitude wasmeasured by identifying themaximum
positive-going value of the Reward and No-reward ERPs
recorded at electrode site Pz, within a window extending
from 300 to 600 ms following the presentation of the
feedback stimulus (see SOM for further details).
Behavioral task—the probabilistic selection task
Consistent with standard practice, the feedback stimuli in
the T-maze task were delivered at random, providing a
means to identify the fERN using the difference wave
approach (Holroyd & Coles 2002; Holroyd & Krigolson
2007; Baker & Holroyd 2009; Holroyd et al. 2009), but
for this reason the task did not provide a meaningful per-
formancemeasure. Hence, immediately after participants
completed the T-maze, we asked them to engage in the
PST, a task designed to identify individual biases to learn-
ing from positive or negative feedback (Frank et al. 2004).
In brief, during an initial Learning Phase, participants
were exposed to three pairs of stimuli presented in
random order (for more details, please see SOM). The
response mappings were probabilistic such that one
stimulus in each of the three pairs was rewarded on 80%,
70% and 60% of the trials, respectively, with the remain-
ing stimulus in each pair rewarded on the complemen-
tary percentage of trials. Given that these stimulus
probabilities are not optimal for extracting the fERNusing
the differencewave approach, EEG datawere not recorded
during this task (Holroyd&Krigolson 2007; Holroyd et al.
2009). Participants learned by trial-and-error to choose
the more frequently rewarded stimulus over the alterna-
tive in each pair. Critically, they could do so either by
learning that particular stimuli were associated with
relatively more reward, by learning that particular
stimuli were associated with relatively more punishment,
or both. During theTest Phase, participants were exposed
to all possible combinations of these stimuli in a random
order and were required to select the symbol in each pair
that they believed to be correct, butwithout receiving any
feedback about their choices. If participants learnedmore
from positive feedback during the Learning Phase, then
they should reliably choose the Good Stimulus in all novel
test pairs in which it is present. On the other hand, if they
learnedmore fromnegative feedback during the Learning
Phase, then they should reliably avoid the Bad Stimulus
in all novel test pairs in which it is present. Participants
who did not perform better than chance on Test Phase
trials consisting of the easiest stimulus pair were elimi-
nated from further analysis. In total, the data of six par-
ticipants were discarded.
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As in previous studies, we identified two subgroups of
participants (Frank, Woroch & Curran 2005; Frank,
D’Lauro & Curran 2007). Participantswho tended to pick
the stimulus that was most frequently rewarded during
the Learning Phase (the ‘Good Stimulus’), which depends
on learning from positive reinforcement, were classified
as ‘Positive Learners’, whereas participants who tended
to avoid the stimulus that was most frequently punished
during the Learning Phase (the ‘Bad Stimulus’), which
depends on learning from negative reinforcement, were
classified as ‘Negative Learners’. Six subjects displayed
equally good performance in choosing the Good Stimulus
and avoiding the Bad Stimulus and were not included in
either group (but were included in a continuous measure
of relative learning biases; see next). Group comparisons
confirmed that Positive Learners (n = 32) were better
than Negative Learners (n = 27) at choosing the Good
Stimulus, t(57) = 6.28, P < 0.001, whereas Negative
Learners were better than Positive Learners at avoiding
the Bad Stimulus, t(57) = -4.7, P < 0.001 (for more
details, see SOM).
RESULTS
Electrophysiological results
Figure 1 (a and b) illustrates the ERPs elicited by the
Reward and No-reward feedback and the associated dif-
ference waves, averaged across participants separately for
the Non-dependent and Dependent Groups. The ERPs for
the Non-dependent Group revealed a typical fERN occur-
ring at about 250 ms following feedback presentation
(Holroyd & Coles 2002) (Fig. 1a), whereas the ERPs for
the Dependent Group were nearly identical, exhibiting
little difference between conditions (Fig. 1b). Figure 1c
presents the associated difference waves together,
(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Figure 1 Event-related brain potential (ERP) data associated with frontal-central electrode channel FCz. Grand-average ERPs associated with
Reward (blue dotted lines) and No-reward (red dashed lines) outcomes and associated difference waves (black solid lines) for the (a)
Non-dependent Group and the (b) Dependent Group. (c) Feedback error-related negativity (fERN) difference waves for the Non-dependent
Group (solid lines) and Dependent Group (dashed lines). In a–c, 0 ms corresponds to time of feedback delivery. (d) fERN amplitude as a
function of LearnerType (Positive and Negative) derived from performance on the Probabilistic SelectionTask, for the Non-dependent Group
(solid line) and the Dependent Group (dashed line). Bars indicate the standard error of the mean. Negative voltages are plotted up by
convention
Substance dependence 461
© 2010 The Authors, Addiction Biology © 2010 Society for the Study of Addiction Addiction Biology, 16, 458–466
revealing a truncated fERN in the Dependent Group
(M = -1.9 mV, SE = 0.4) relative to the Non-dependent
Group (M = -3.6 mV, SE = 0.5), t(34) = -2.34, P <
0.05. Further analysis indicated that the amplitudes of
the P200 and the P300 were about the same for the two
groups (P > 0.05), confirming that the effect of interest
was isolated to the predicted ERP component—the
fERN—and thus did not reflect an overall processing
difference between the groups. Moreover, this effect
remained statistically significant when variability associ-
ated with personality-related risk factors for substance
use (i.e. depression-proneness, anxiety, impulsivity and
sensation seeking), as measured by the SURPS and APP,
was controlled for using ANCOVA, F(1, 36) = 3.9,
P < 0.05. Hence, the degree of substance use appears to
have affected fERN amplitude independently of the per-
sonality traits that precipitated the substance use in the
first place.
Behavioral results
Overall, a two-way ANOVA on Test Phase accuracy with
Group (Non-dependent, Dependent) and Stimulus type
(Positive, Negative) as factors revealed a main effect of
Group, indicating that the Non-dependent Group per-
formed more accurately (83%) than the Dependent
Group (66%) did, F(1,31) = 9.2, P < 0.005, ES = 0.23
(Fig. 2a). Specifically, Non-dependent participants
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2 Performance on the Probabilistic Selection Task (PST). Accuracy in the Test Phase of the PST for the Dependent and Non-
dependent Groups, separately for the Choose Good and Avoid Bad conditions, for (a) all participants, (b) Negative Learners only and (c)
Positive Learners only. Note that chance accuracy is 50%. (d) Learning Index Scores derived from the PST accuracy data, separately for Positive
and Negative Learners. Dependent Group data are indicated by circles and dotted lines and Non-dependent Group data are indicated by
squares and solid lines. Bars indicate standard errors of the mean
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avoided choosing the Bad Stimulus more often (84%)
than Dependent participants did (65%), t(28) = 2.7,
P < 0.01, and there was a trend such that the Non-
dependent participants chose the Good Stimulus (84%)
more often than the Dependent participants did (66%),
t(28) = 1.8, P < 0.08. No between-group differences in
performance were found during the Learning Phase of
the task (see SOM for details).
We examined this between-group difference in Test
Phase accuracy by classifying the Dependent and Non-
dependent participants as either Negative or Positive
Learners. For Negative Learners, both groups tended to
avoid choosing the Bad Stimulus about equally often,
t(12) = 1.2, P > 0.05, but the Non-dependent partici-
pants (n = 7) tended to chose the Good Stimulus more
often (75%) than the Dependent participants (n = 7) did
(44%), t(12) = 2.7, P < 0.05 (Fig. 2b). Likewise, for Posi-
tive Learners, both groups tended to choose the Good
Stimulus about equally often, t(14) = 0.92, P > 0.05, but
the Non-dependent participants (n = 7) tended to avoid
choosing the Bad Stimulus more often (76%) than the
Dependent participants (n = 9) did (50%), t(14) = 2.8,
P < 0.01 (Fig. 2c).
We investigated this issue further by determining for
each subject the degree towhich they used their preferred
strategy relative to their non-preferred strategy. For each
subject, we computed the Learning Index Score (LIS),
defined as LIS = (preferred accuracy – non-preferred
accuracy)/(preferred accuracy + non-preferred accu-
racy); higher LIS scores indicate a greater preference for
one strategy over the other. The LIS scores for Dependent
andNon-dependent participants are shown separately for
Positive and Negative Learners in Fig. 2d. A two-way
ANOVA on LIS as a function of Group (Non-dependent,
Dependent), and learner type (Positive, Negative) revealed
a main effect of Group, F(1, 28) = 14.46, P < 0.001,
ES = 0.35, indicating that Dependent participants exhib-
ited a larger learning bias (Mean = 0.30) compared with
Non-dependent participants (Mean = 0.10); all other
main effects and interactions were not significant,
P > 0.05. Taken together, these results indicate that the
Dependent and Non-dependent participants performed
the task about equally well when allowed to use their
preferred strategies, but that the Dependent participants
were severely impaired relative to theNon-dependent par-
ticipants when required to use their non-preferred strate-
gies. Thus, the overall performance difference across
groups illustrated in Fig. 2a resulted mainly from the
Dependent participants responding at chance accuracy
when forced to rely on their less favored methods for
response selection. Note that this finding argues against a
general cognitive or learning impairment in the Depen-
dentparticipants,whichwouldbe expected to impact both
strategies equally.
Interaction between fERN and PST results
Given that the reward processing system that produces
the fERN might be sensitive to learning style, we exam-
ined fERN amplitude as a function of both Group and
Learner Type. A two-way ANOVA on fERN amplitude
with Group (Non-dependent, Dependent) and Learner
Type (Positive, Negative) as factors revealed a significant
interaction between Group and Learner Type, F(1,
28) = 4.3, P < 0.05, ES = 0.13 (Fig. 1d). Post hoc analysis
revealed that the ERP effect of interest was mainly driven
by a reduced fERN in Dependent Negative Learners
(M = -1.2 mV, SE = 0.5) relative to Non-dependent
Negative Learners (M = -4.7 mV, SE = 0.4), P < 0.01;
all other paired comparisons were non-significant
(P > 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons using Bon-
feronni correction). In other words, the reduced fERN in
the Dependent Group relative to the Non-dependent
Group was associated with the participants who were
better in the PST at avoiding the Bad Stimulus than at
choosing the Good Stimulus. Further, a two-way ANOVA
on each of the personality trait scores as a function of
LearnerType and Group revealed that none of these were
related to Learner Type or Group (P > 0.05) except for
Depression-proneness (Conrod & Woicik 2002). Specifi-
cally, Dependent Positive Learners scored higher on the
Depression-proneness scale (M = 14, SE = 1.1) than did
Dependent Negative Learners (M = 10, SE = 0.6),
t(14) = 2.4, P < 0.05. In other words, Dependent partici-
pants who scored high on the Depression-proneness scale
were relatively successful in the PST at choosing the Good
Stimulus but relatively impaired at avoiding the Bad
Stimulus. Further analysis indicated that scores on
the Depression-proneness were about the same for the
Non-dependent Positive Learner compared with the
Non-dependent Negative Learner Group (P > 0.05),
confirming that the effect of interest was isolated to
Dependent Group and thus did not reflect an overall
difference in Depression-proneness between learning
strategies. Taken together, these results indicate that
Dependent individuals who fail to learn from reward
feedback produce a truncated neural response to
feedback, whereas Dependent individuals who fail to
learn from error feedback exhibit higher levels of
Depression-proneness.
DISCUSSION
Our findings are indicative of two separate groups of
dependent drug users, one characterized by impaired
reward learning and the other characterized by impaired
error learning. According to a neurocomputational
theory of the fERN, this electrophysiological signal is
argued to be elicited by the impact of RPEs carried by the
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MDS onto motor areas in ACC, where they are utilized for
the adaptive modification of behavior according to prin-
ciples of reinforcement learning (Holroyd & Coles 2002).
Importantly, the difference in the ERPs elicited by positive
and negative feedback has recently been shown to result
mainly from reward processing induced by positive feed-
back (Cohen, Elger & Ranganath 2007; Holroyd, Pakzad-
Vaezi & Krigolson 2008). In line with this observation, we
found that for the dependent individuals who were
impaired at reward learning, a negative-going deflection
in the ERP following Reward trials mirrored the negative-
going deflection in the ERP following No-reward trials. In
other words, reward feedback failed to induce dopamine-
dependent reward processing in these individuals.
Further, computational simulations of the BG-MDS have
indicated that disrupted positive dopamine RPEs tend to
upset reward learning while sparing error learning
(Cohen & Frank 2008) as we observed (Fig. 2b). These
findings are consistent with the proposal that substance
dependence is associated with the impact of impaired
dopamine-mediated reinforcement learning signals on
neural areas for cognitive control and decision-making.
It remains to be determined whether the drug use was
a consequence or the cause of this reward processing
impairment. On the one hand, the findings survived sta-
tistical control of several important personality-related
risk factors for drug use. Further, the results are consis-
tent with the observation that all drugs of abuse stimu-
late the dopamine system (Di Chiara & Imperato 1988),
resulting in maladaptive synaptic changes (Hyman et al.
2006) that disrupt neural networks in ACC, OFC and BG
(Robinson & Kolb 2004; Homayoun & Moghaddam
2006), which in turn desensitizes the system to non-drug
rewards (Koob & Le Moal 2005) like the small monetary
incentives used here (Volkow et al. 2009). These consid-
erations suggest that heavy drug use may have modified
the MDS and its neural targets in this population. On the
other hand, it is also possible that abnormal dopamine
signals resulted directly from dopamine-related genetic
polymorphisms associated with addiction-proneness
(Kreek et al. 2005), impaired reward learning and spared
error learning (Cohen & Frank 2008), and reduced fERN
amplitudes (Marco-Pallares et al. 2009). In fact, we
suspect that both factors may be involved, such that in
dependence-prone individuals the reinforcing properties
of addictive drugs exploit genetic vulnerabilities to the
dopamine system.
By contrast, we found that the dependent individuals
who were impaired at error learning scored high on the
depression-proneness scale when compared with depen-
dent individuals whowere not impaired at error learning.
It is interesting to note that depression and drug depen-
dence are highly comorbid, not only because depressed
individuals tend to take drugs of abuse for the purpose of
self-medication (Markou, Kosten & Koob 1998), but also
because substance use can lead to depression (Rehm,
Taylor & Room 2006). Further, depressed individuals
sometimes rely on the analgesic properties of alcohol and
other drugs to ameliorate negative affect (Conrod &
Woicik 2002), which directs their thought processes
away from negative self-rumination toward positive self-
reflection (Stephens & Curtin 1995). In this way, the
analgesic properties of drugs can reinforce behaviors
that protect against negative, self-relevant information
(Markou et al. 1998). Hence, we suggest that the
depression-prone dependent individuals in this study
tended to ignore error feedback in favor of positive feed-
back during the Training phase of the PST, leading to
better performance on the ‘Choose Good’ trials relative to
the ‘Avoid Bad’ trials during the Test Phase of the PST.
Consistent with this view, substance use could impair
error learning directly by altering OFC structure and
function (Robinson & Kolb 2004; Homayoun & Moghad-
dam 2006), thereby disrupting ‘top-down’ regulation of
the BG Go and No-go pathways (Cohen & Frank 2008;
Wheeler & Fellows 2008). The transition of these indi-
viduals from a propensity to use addictive substances to
dependence could also be facilitated by dopamine-related
genetic vulnerabilities associated with addiction-
proneness (Kreek et al. 2005), impaired negative learning
and spared positive learning (Klein et al. 2007; Cohen &
Frank 2008), and reduced error-related brain activation
in ACC (Klein et al. 2007).
Although our participants were not screened for the
presence of comorbid disorders, such as attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder and major depression, the experi-
mental results remained robust even when the effects
of personality traits related to anxiety, depression-
proneness, impulsivity and sensation seeking were con-
trolled for statistically. Nevertheless, future studies should
examine this possible confounding factor. It was also the
case that the participants were not screened for acute
drug use before starting the experimental session. Aside
from the fact that they did not display any obvious signs of
recent drug or alcohol use while being tested, we believe
that our results are uncontaminated by acute drug use
for the following reasons. First, dopamine agonists such
as caffeine, nicotine and amphetamine increase ERN
amplitude (Overbeek et al. 2005; Jocham & Ullsperger
2009), but the dependent individuals in our study exhib-
ited decreased, rather than increased, fERNs. Second,
depressants such as alcohol tend to depress other ERP
components such as the P300 in addition to the ERN
(Holroyd & Yeung 2003; Polich & Criado 2006). By con-
trast, despite the large reduction in fERN amplitude in the
dependent participants in our study, the P200 and P300
components appeared entirely normal—indicating that
the effects of drug use were in fact limited to the fERN.
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Given that substance users bring with them diverse
life histories, personalities, biological/genetic profiles and
drug preferences, substance dependence has proven
extremely challenging to treat. An obvious next step
would be the inclusion of neurobiological markers of
substance dependence in individually tailored treatment
programs. For instance, combined assessment of electro-
physiological, cognitive and genetic profiles could poten-
tially improve upon current therapeutic approaches and
better predict vulnerability to relapse. By highlighting
important neurobiological and behavioral differences
between two classes of dependent users, this research
may represent an important step in this promising
direction.
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